4/10/2020
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The petitioners appealed to the NLRC, but the labor agency denied the appeal. It
agreed with the labor arbiter that the case involves a money claim and is within the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter, in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
Additionally, it declared that the denial of the motion to dismiss is an interlocutory
order which is not appealable. Accordingly, it remanded the case to the labor arbiter
for further proceedings. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC
denied the motion, prompting the petitioners to elevate the case to the CA through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA Decision
Through its decision of September 22, 2010,[7] the CA denied the petition on
procedural and substantive grounds.
Procedurally, it found the petitioners to have availed of the wrong remedy when they
challenged the labor arbiter’s denial of their motion to dismiss by way of an appeal to
the NLRC. It stressed that pursuant to the NLRC rules,[8] an order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
On the merits of the case, the CA believed that the petition cannot also prosper. It
rejected the petitioners’ submission that the grievance and voluntary arbitration
procedure of the parties’ CBA has jurisdiction over the case, to the exclusion of the
labor arbiter and the NLRC. As the labor arbiter and the NLRC did, it opined that under
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, the labor arbiter has the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear Fernandez’s money claims.
Further, the CA clarified that while the law[9] allows parties to submit to voluntary
arbitration other labor disputes, including matters falling within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code as this
Court recognized in Vivero v. Court of Appeals,[10] the parties’ submission agreement
must be expressed in unequivocal language. It found no such unequivocal language in
the AMOSUP/TCC CBA that the parties agreed to submit money claims or, more
specifically, claims for disability benefits to voluntary arbitration.
The CA also took note of the POEA-SEC[11] which provides in its Section 29 that in
cases of claims and disputes arising from a Filipino seafarer’s employment, the parties
covered by a CBA shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. The CA
explained that the relevant POEA-SEC provisions should likewise be qualified by the
ruling in the Vivero case, the Labor Code, and other applicable laws and jurisprudence.
In sum, the CA stressed that the jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators is limited to the
seafarers’ claims which do not fall within the labor arbiter’s original and exclusive
jurisdiction or even in cases where the labor arbiter has jurisdiction, the parties have
agreed in unmistakable terms (through their CBA) to submit the case to voluntary
arbitration.
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/55239
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