he puts forward the defense of alibi. We are not convinced by appellant’s line of reasoning which appears ostensibly compelling, at the outset, but is ultimately rendered inutile by jurisprudence and the evidence at hand. With regard to appellant’s first point, we express our agreement with the statement made by the Court of Appeals that it is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave birth ten (10) months after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases of long gestations. In any event, we dismiss appellant’s contention as immaterial to the case at bar because jurisprudence tells us that impregnation is not an element of rape.20 This rule was eloquently explained in People v. Bejic21 : It is well–entrenched in our case law that the rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. (Citation omitted.) chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary Likewise, we assign no significance to the testimony of defense witness Jackie Gucela. Firstly, AAA categorically denied that Jackie Gucela was her boyfriend 22 or that she had sexual relations with him or any other person other than appellant near the time of the rape incidents at issue.23 For the sweetheart theory to be believed when invoked by the accused, convincing evidence to prove the existence of the supposed relationship must be presented by the proponent of the theory. We elucidated on this principle in People v. Bayrante,24 to wit: For the [“sweetheart”] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self–serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like. (Citation omitted.) chanRoblesvi rtua lLa wlibra ry chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary In the present case, although it is a person other than the accused who is claiming to be the victim’s sweetheart and the father of her child, such an assertion must nonetheless be believably demonstrated by the evidence. The defense failed to discharge the burden of proving that AAA and Jackie Gucela had any kind of romantic or sexual relationship which resulted in AAA’s pregnancy. We quote with approval the discussion made by the Court of Appeals on this matter: Like the trial court, We have our reservations on [Jackie]’s credibility. AAA, from the outset, has denied any romantic involvement with [Jackie]. On the other hand, to prove his claim that they were sweethearts, [Jackie] presented three love letters purportedly authored by AAA. An examination of the contents of the letters however fails to indicate any intimate relations between AAA and [Jackie]. Nowhere in the contents of the said letters did AAA even profess her love for [Jackie]. In the first letter, [Jackie] maintained that AAA signed the letter as “SHE” to hide her identity. Other than such assertion, he however failed to establish by any conclusive proof that the “SHE” and AAA were one and the same person. Neither did he explain if he was the “Boy” being alluded to in the first letter. The second letter, which was also unsigned by AAA, was a poem written by chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary