4/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly availed of in order to pave way for a procedural shortcut.[26] (Emphasis in the original) The Mañas Spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied in a March 16, 2009 Order.[27] The trial court stated: The issue that the subject Deed of Absolute Sale is a simulated contract and therefore void was raised by the plaintiffs in their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Although this issue was not threshed out in the assailed Order, this Court believes that to attack the validity of [the] Deed of Absolute Sale for being simulated should be made in an action for Annulment of Contracts, not in an action for Rescission. This Court had already ruled that the expiration of the subject Contract of Lease carries with it the termination of the Plaintiffs' Right of First Refusal. Such being the case, to notify the Plaintiffs of the defendants' intention to sell the property in question is no longer necessary and has no legal effect; and a suit instituted in order to compel the latter to allow the former to exercise the said right, states no cause of action.[28] Hence, the Mañas Spouses filed a Notice of Appeal.[29] In their Brief, they again alleged that Roselle was a minor at the time of sale; hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale was void.[30] They also faulted the trial court for ruling that their Complaint stated no cause of action.[31] They asserted that the trial court incorrectly found that they had no right of first refusal because the contract was not expressly renewed.[32] In its April 17, 2013 Decision,[33] the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's rulings, and also made the following findings: A closer scrutiny of the records reveals that even on the face of the Complaint alone, there is absent a cause of action. The Contract of Lease expressly provides for a term/duration for its validity, that is, one (1) year from the date of execution of the said Lease Contract on April 18, 2005. Likewise, provided in the said Contract was that the renewal of the said lease at the option of the lessee. In this case, the continued possession of plaintiffs-appellants as lessees of the leased premises is evidence of his exercise of the option to extend the lease. In such a case, their continued possession of the leased premises after the end or expiration of the time fixed in the Contract of Lease, with the acquiescence of the lessor, constitutes an implied renewal of the lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687 of the New Civil Code, so that if rentals were stipulated to be paid monthly, the new lease is deemed to have been renewed from month to month and may be terminated each month upon demand by the lessor.[34] https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/66171 5/14