4/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly or right of first refusal is not germane to possession, rather, it is strange to possession.[20] Meanwhile, Rosalina, Janet, and Anthony filed an Answer with Counterclaim.[21] Akin to Roselle, they argued that the right of first refusal was "granted only during the original term of the contract of lease,"[22] and that the Complaint was prematurely filed.[23] In their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the Mañas Spouses claimed that the sale was invalid owing to Roselle's alleged incapacity; that is, she was a minor when the sale was made.[24] On January 7, 2009,[25] the Regional Trial Court granted Roselle's Motion to Dismiss, effectively dismissing the Mañas Spouses' case. It discussed: Defendant Uy-Cua argues that the plaintiffs never exercised the option to renew the lease contract after its expiration, thus the condition thereof granting the latter the right of first refusal (Priority to Buy), was never renewed. Although there was an implied renewal of the contract of lease in (sic) a month-to-month basis, in accordance with Article 1670 of the New Civil Code, the plaintiffs' right of first refusal was never renewed for the reason that the said condition is not germane to possession. Furthermore, defendant Uy-Cua asserted that the filing of the case is premature. The case did not undergo the required Barangay Conciliation, pursuant to RA 7160, a condition precedent before resort to the courts is initiated. .... . . . Nothing in the questioned contract of lease provides for an extension of the life after the term thereof had expired. Verily, the continued occupation by the plaintiffs of th e leased premises after the term has expired, but with the consent of the defendants, constitutes an implied renewal. . . . .... It may be amiss to consider plaintiffs' reliance on the "whereases" narrated in the contract of lease, of which one of them stated that: "whereas, the lessee is also interested in buying the same real property during the existence of the lease or thereafter." According to the plaintiffs, the word "THEREAFTER" bestowed upon them to exercise the Right of First Refusal even after the term of the contract has expired. This is absurd. To consider and to give effect to this contention is to create an infinite contractual relationship between the parties. More so, the "whereases" mentioned in the contract are only considered premises and/or introduction, and definitely does not form part of the terms and conditions of the subject contract of lease. Lastly, on the issue of barangay conciliation, clearly, Section 412 of RA 7160, is controlling. Unless, it is shown that the subject legal process is being https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/66171 4/14