complainant Durano on 19 January 1993 had to be postponed because of two other cases pending hearing does not constitute a violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. The parties in said two cases likewise deserve a speedy disposition of their cases 70 and, understandably, the trial judge had to budget the court’s time to accommodate them. All in all, there was actually only one unjustified postponement in the proceedings below, which cannot be described as vexatious, capricious or oppressive. Appellant next claims that his conviction constituted double jeopardy since these cases were allegedly already dismissed by Branch 52 of the Manila RTC, presided by Judge David Nitafan. Apparently, private complainants Genteroy and Onza filed separate complaints for estafa (MeTC Crim. Case Nos. 286919-20) against appellant prior to the filing of the complaints for estafa by private complainant Durano and for illegal recruitment in large scale by all three. Convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila of two counts of estafa and sentenced in each case to one year of prision correccional, the accused appealed to the Manila RTC, Branch 52 (Crim. Case Nos. 93-125980-81). Judge Nitafan ordered the release of the accused on the ground that service of the accused’s sentence should be simultaneous and that the accused had served such sentence. For double jeopardy to exist, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. 71 The cases before Branch 52 consisted of two counts of estafa committed against Genteroy and Onza. On the other hand, the present cases, which sprang from Branch 18, are for one count of estafa committed against Durano and for illegal recruitment in large scale, filed at the instance of Durano, Genteroy and Onza. Plainly, there is no identity between the estafa cases in Branch 52 and the estafa case in Branch 18 because each case arose from different sets of facts and committed against different persons. Neither do any of the estafa cases bar a prosecution for illegal recruitment, since they are entirely different offenses and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition be convicted of estafa under Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no problem of jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused is necessary.72 The claim of double jeopardy, therefore, is patently without merit. Appellant accuses Judge Laguio, Jr., who rendered the appealed decision, of falsifying the rendition of the judgment of conviction. The Judge allegedly antedated the judgment to make it appear that the decision was rendered on 24 February 1994. In a notice from the clerk of court, however, defense counsel was informed that promulgation of judgment was to be made on 5 April 1994. The motive for such falsification was to prevent double jeopardy from attaching because defense counsel had informed Judge Laguio, Jr. that Judge Nitafan had already ordered appellant’s release in the latter’s Decision dated 24 March 1994. Appellant makes equally serious allegations against the police, whom he accuses of taking his valuables, of arbitrary detention or delay in his delivery to the judicial authorities, and of violating his right to counsel. The accusations against the trial judge, as well as against the police, have no bearing in the disposition of this appeal. They are not relevant in the adjudication of his guilt and have no place in these proceedings. The veracity of appellant’s accusations will have to await the filing of the appropriate charges and the conduct of an investigation before the proper forum. The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when the following elements concur, to wit: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to engage lawfully in recruitment and placement of workers; (2) he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13, paragraph (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; and (3) that the accused commits the acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 73 All three elements were established during the trial. The first element is substantiated by the POEA certification.74 The second is supported by the testimonies of the private complainants Durano, Genteroy and Onza. The third element is evident from the number of complainants against whom the accused committed illegal recruitment. The absence of receipts to evidence payment to the recruiter would not warrant an acquittal, a receipt not being fatal to the prosecution’s cause.75 The trial court found the testimonies of private complainants to be credible.76The assessment of the testimonial evidence by the trial judge is accorded the highest respect for it was he who had the distinct opportunity to directly perceive the demeanor of witnesses and personally ascertain their reliability. 1âwphi1 The penalty prescribed for illegal recruitment in large scale is life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00. Thus, the trial court imposed the correct penalty for illegal recruitment in large scale upon appellant. Appellant is also guilty of estafa, defined and punished by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code: ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). —Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. …. 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.