resisted and was able to escape the clutches of respondent to rejoin the group that they were
travelling with. Respondent apologized to petitioner thrice regarding that incident.
1av vphi1
Based on the investigation conducted by the LGU’s Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(CODI), respondent was found guilty of all three charges by Municipal Mayor Marvic S. Padilla. For
the offenses committed against De la Cruz and Gayaton, respondent was meted the penalties of
reprimand for his first offense of light harassment and 30 days’ suspension for his first offense of
less grave sexual harassment. His transgression against petitioner, however, was deemed to be
grave sexual harassment for which he was dismissed from the government service.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) passed only on the decision in the case filed by
petitioner since, under the CSC rules, the penalty of reprimand and/or suspension of not more than
30 days cannot be appealed. The CSC dismissed the appeal but modified Mayor Padilla’s order by
holding respondent guilty of grave misconduct instead of grave sexual harassment.9 The same
penalty of dismissal from the service, however, was meted out to respondent.
Respondent’s next recourse was to the CA which partially granted his appeal. The CA modified the
CSC resolution, finding respondent guilty only of simple misconduct.10 Accordingly, the penalty was
lowered to suspension for one month and one day.
Petitioner comes to this Court to appeal the downgrading of respondent’s offense to simple
misconduct.
The core issue for our resolution is whether the acts committed by respondent against petitioner
(since the CSC resolution only touched upon petitioner’s complaint) constitute simple misconduct or
grave misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior.11 To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.12 In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.13
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional.
Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz,
who made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent
committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature
of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were
carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they
were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to
other persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s
married state, and good character and reputation.
We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule attended the incident in question. RA14 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995, took effect on March 5, 1995. Respondent was charged with knowledge of the existence of
this law and its contents, more so because he was a public servant. His act of grabbing petitioner
and attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of his intention to
violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the work environment.
Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss petitioner
was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial – that intimate
physical contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondent’s defiance of custom and