Department of Foreign Affairs vs NLRC : 113191 : September 18, 1996...
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http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/sept1996/113191.htm
National Labor Relations Commission, has been erroneously premised on Art. 218(c) of the Labor Code,
as cited in the letter of Secretary Padilla, considering that the provision deals with 'a question, matter or
controversy within its (the Commission) jurisdiction' obviously referring to a labor dispute within the
ambit of Art. 217 (on jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission over labor cases).
"The procedure, in the adjudication of labor cases, including raising of defenses, is prescribed by law. The
defense of immunity could have been raised before the Labor Arbiter by a special appearance which,
naturally, may not be considered as a waiver of the very defense being raised. Any decision thereafter is
subject to legal remedies, including appeals to the appropriate division of the Commission and/or a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Except where an
appeal is seasonably and properly made, neither the Commission nor the undersigned may review, or even
question, the propriety of any decision by a Labor Arbiter. Incidentally, the Commission sits en banc (all
fifteen Commissioners) only to promulgate rules of procedure or to formulate policies (Art. 213, Labor
Code).
"On the other hand, while the undersigned exercises 'administrative supervision over the Commission and
its regional branches and all its personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters'
(penultimate paragraph, Art. 213, Labor Code), he does not have the competence to investigate or review
any decision of a Labor Arbiter. However, on the purely administrative aspect of the decision-making
process, he may cause that an investigation be made of any misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance, upon
complaint properly made.
"If the Department of Foreign Affairs feels that the action of Labor Arbiter Nieves de Castro constitutes
misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance, it is suggested that an appropriate complaint be lodged with the
Office of the Ombudsman.
[2]
"Thank you for your kind attention."
Dissatisfied, the DFA lodged the instant petition for certiorari. In this Court's resolution of 31
January 1994, respondents were required to comment. Petitioner was later constrained to make
an application for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction following the issuance,
on 16 March 1994, by the Labor Arbiter of a writ of execution. In a resolution, dated 07 April
1994, the Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its comment of 26 May 1994, initially assailed
the claim of immunity by the ADB. Subsequently, however, it submitted a Manifestation (dated 20
June 1994) stating, among other things, that "after a thorough review of the case and the
records," it became convinced that ADB, indeed, was correct in invoking its immunity from suit
under the Charter and the Headquarters Agreement.
The Court is of the same view.
Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:
The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in
connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or
underwrite the sale of securities.
[3]
Under Article 55 thereof All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including experts performing
missions for the Bank:
(1) shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity,
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