Dissenting Opinion
-2-
G.R. No. 224469
The majority opm10n, however, reverses the rulings of the courts
below and acquits petitioners of the crime. It is opined that the prosecution
was unable to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Ultimately, the
majority relies on an "ensuing unfortunate confusion" as to the rights of
indigenous peoples insofar as tree-cutting under the law is concerned.
While doubtless there was a voluntary and knowing act of cutting,
collecting, or harvesting of timber, it is reasonably doubtful that the act was
committed without the requisite State authority. 4
The view espoused by the majority, however, is a deviation not only
from the 1987 Constitution but also from ·pertinent legislative enactments
and established principles in criminal law.
In every criminal case, the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal
case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Time and again, the Court has held that "it is a reasonable doubt on
the evidence presented that will result in an acquittal." 5 Guilt must be
founded on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness
of the defense. In People v. Claro, 6 We ruled that reasonable doubt x x x is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human
affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of
jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.xx xx If upon
such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the
benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability,
though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged
is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish
the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment
of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be
proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends
upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require
absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.
4
5
6
See majority opinion, p. 33.
~
Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019.
808 Phil. 455, 464-465 (2017). (Emphasis ours)