However, Romero claims that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition
since he filed the same within the 60-day reglementary period. According to
Romero, he received the Resolution of the NLRC on 14 April 1999 and he filed his
Motion for Reconsideration on 26 April 1999, since the 10th day, 24 April 1999,
fell on a Saturday. Romero posits that 26 April 1999 should now be considered as
the 10th day, thus he still had a period of fifty (50) days upon receipt of the denial
of his motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Since he received the denial of his motion for
reconsideration on 9 August 1999, Romero argues that he filed the petition on time
on 29 September 1999.
Romeros argument that 26 April 1999, which is a Monday, should be considered as
the 10th day considering that the 10th day, 24 April 1999, fell on a Saturday is bereft
of merit. The case of Narzoles v. NLRC[8] is instructive on the manner of
computation of the 60-day period under Circular No. 39-98:
There is no question that the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98,
which took effect on September 1, 1998, were already in force, and therefore
applicable when petitioners filed their petition. Statutes regulating the procedure of
the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense. No vested rights attach to
procedural laws. Consequently, the CA, in accordance with Circular No. 39-98,
correctly deducted the 16 days (the fifteenth day was a Sunday) it took for
petitioners to file their motion for reconsideration from the 60 day
reglementary period. As petitioners only had the remaining period of 44 days
from 19 October 1998, when it received a copy of the resolution denying
reconsideration, to file the petition for certiorari, or until 8 December 1998,
the filing of the petition on 17 December 1998 was nine (9) days too late.
[9]
(Emphasis supplied)
At the time Romero filed his petition for Certiorari before the appellate court,
Circular No. 39-98 was already in force, hence the appellate court correctly
dismissed his petition. Likewise, Circular No. 39-98 was still in force when
Romero filed his motion for reconsideration, thus the appellate court correctly
dismissed his motion on the ground that his petition was filed two days late.