deliberations also express nothing on the necessity to determine a prior sexual abuse to qualify the lascivious conduct. If a prior sexual abuse was an integral element for prosecution, then it stands to reason that the language of the law or the deliberations should have addressed the same. And third, while the grammatical structure of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 may, if construed literally, be taken to mean that the victim should be one who is first "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" as previously intimated during the deliberations on this case, this interpretation would surely depart from the law's purpose based on its policy considerations as afore-discussed. On the other hand, it is my view that Section 5 (b) can be construed in another way, in order to give full life and meaning to its avowed purpose, which is to "provide stiffer penalties for abuse of children and to facilitate prosecution of perpetrators of abuse." Particularly, it is observed that the phrase "a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse" in Section 5 (b) has been priorly defined in the first paragraph of the same provision as "[a child], whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge[s] in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct." Hence, just by switching this phrase with its equivalent technical definition in the first paragraph, Section 5 (b) may then be construed as follows: "Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct against [a child], whether male or female, x x x for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group." To my mind, this reading equally passes grammatical logic, and most importantly, renders Section 5 (b) consistent with the fundamental intent of the law. Besides, nowhere from the entirety of the law's other provisions nor the deliberations on the same could one discern that the requirement of a prior sexual affront on a child exists. Ultimately, despite Section 5 (b)'s ambiguous wording, it should be remembered that in the final analysis: The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.[5] ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition. The conviction of petitioner Eduardo Quimvel y Braga for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b),