who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.[21] The conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.[22] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove appellants active participation in the illegal recruitment activities of the agency. As already established, appellant received the processing fees of the private complainants for and in behalf of Mrs. Reyes who ordered her to receive the same. She neither gave an impression that she had the ability to deploy them abroad nor convinced them to part with their money. More importantly, she had no knowledge that the license was suspended the day before she received the money. Their failure to depart for Taiwan was due to the suspension of the license, an event which appellant did not have control of. Her failure to refund their money immediately upon their demand was because the money had been remitted to Mrs. Reyes on the same day she received it from them. While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite moral certainty, as they admit of the alternative inference that other persons, not necessarily the appellant, may have perpetrated the crime. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be acquitted. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. [23] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Criminal Case No. 99-176637 finding appellant Elizabeth Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Elizabeth Corpuz is ACQUITTED of the offense charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant unless she is lawfully held for another offense, and to inform this Court of the date of her release, or the ground for her continued confinement, within ten days from notice. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Azcuna, J., on leave. [1] Rollo, pp. 65-76; penned by Judge Romulo A. Lopez. [2] Rollo, p. 6. [3] Also known as Mrs. Ty. [4] TSN, May 8, 2000, pp. 3-5. [5] TSN, May 8, 2000, pp. 5-8.