04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect. The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.[163] What IPRA only requires is that these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity. Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines.[164] With regard to ancestral domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the final report of the ADO.[165] With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report by the ADO.[166] Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples. Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP[167] and the application of customary law,[168] violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of indigenous peoples,[169] and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving indigenous peoples,[170] including even disputes between a member of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of ancestral domains.[171] Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They merely contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."[172] elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/36882 104/148