In the case at bar, petitioner became the accredited recruitment agency of the principal, M.S. Al Babtain Recruitment Office, on September 3, 1990, after MARS had filed on July 5, 1990, its answer to Macarayas complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner got involved only on January 9, 1992, when it was impleaded in the case upon MARS motion. The case having been submitted for decision long before it became a party, petitioner naturally filed an answer alleging its own claims against MARS. Under the Rules of Court which were then in effect and applicable to the case at bar, when MARS failed to file an answer to petitioners cross-claim, it should have been declared in default with respect to such claim.xvii[17] In labor cases, however, technical rules of procedure are not applicable,xviii[18] but may apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character, for instance, when there is a need to attain substantial justice and an expeditious, practical and convenient solution to a labor problem.xix[19] Hence, when the POEA opted to overlook petitioners cross-claim against MARS, petitioner was denied substantial justice. MARS impleaded petitioner in the case after it had been submitted for decision and one-and-a-half years after it had filed its answer. During this hiatus, the case lay dormant in the POEA. It should be noted that petitioner became the accredited recruitment agency on September 3, 1990, two months after MARS had filed its answer to the complaint. The POEAs inaction ad interim provided MARS with an opportunity to escape liability. Basic principles of justice and equity, however, dictate that MARS should not be totally cleared of its liability to Macaraya under the peculiar circumstances of this case. Section 6, Rule II, Book III of the POEA Rules may not be used as a shield against liability by a recruitment agency that has been substituted by a foreign principal as its local recruitment agency after it has clearly incurred liability in favor of an overseas worker. After all, the POEA is presumed by law to have intended right and justice to prevailxx[20] in promulgating its rules. Consequently, considering that it was MARS with whom Macaraya entered into a contract and that it had been accorded due process at the proceedings before the POEA, it is but meet and just that MARS be the one to be held accountable for her claims. In so ruling, the Court is not in any way invalidating Section 6, Rule II, Book III of the POEA Rules. The presumption of its validity remains. Its application in this case should, however, be an exception to the rule. Petitioner shall pay Macaraya the amount due her under the assailed POEA decision, without prejudice to its right to be reimbursed by MARS under the provision of the Civil Code that (w)hoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid.xxi[21] WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the NLRC dated March 21, 1994, and August 10, 1994, are hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent Mars International Manpower, Inc. shall reimburse petitioner ABD Overseas Manpower