Office(,) to herein complainant originally recruited and processed by the former agency,
MARS.iii[3]
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, petitioner prayed for the
reversal of the POEAs decision and the invalidation of Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the
POEA Rules, citing the rule against unjust enrichment. Thus, it alleged:
14.1 Macaraya was deployed January 30, 1990 by MARS; she stayed and worked in
Riyadh only for three (3) months and 13 days and was repatriated on May 13, 1990.
She filed the complaint against MARS on May 14, 1990. Hence, her cause of action
ripened and/or accrued as of that early date as against MARS, her placement agency.
Further, it is significant to state here that MARS filed its answer to the complaint on July
5, 1990 wherein it made admissions and averred its affirmative defenses by way of
confession and avoidance of liability. How then could ABD be made to `assume full and
complete responsibility to all contractual obligations under the aforecited Rule when the
accreditation of M.S. Al Babtain in its favor was made only on September 3, 1990 per
POEA records, and was only `impleaded in this case by motion of MARS on January 9,
1992?
14.2 When MARS filed its answer on July 5, 1990, long before ABD was made a party
respondent, it caused a joinder of issues in the case. Under the well-settled principle of
estoppel, it cannot (after filing such answer) now be heard to say one and a half years
later (on January 9, 1992 when it impleaded ABD in the case) that ABD must `be
summoned to answer for the claims of herein Complainant. x x x. That late, and in filing
its answer to the complaint, MARS is certainly estopped from shifting to ABD whatever
liability it had under the contract it entered into with Macaraya, or for any violations
thereof by its principal, or any POEA rules/regulations - - which all accrued/occurred
when accreditation was NOT yet transferred to ABD. Ignoring these facts/
circumstances constitute a clear case of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Hon. Administrator.iv[4] (Underscoring supplied)
By resolution dated March 21, 1994,v[5] the NLRC dismissed the appeal. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration met the same fate on August 10, 1994.vi[6] Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
Petitioner alleges that in the assailed resolution of March 21, 1994, the NLRC merely
quoted the findings of the POEA Administrator and concluded that it should assume full
and complete responsibility to the contractual obligation of the foreign principal to
Macaraya. Petitioner questions the failure of the NLRC to make categorical rulings on
the issues it had raised in its memorandum on appeal and, therefore, the NLRC should
be charged with evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by law. MARS had allegedly already answered the complaint when petitioner became
the transferee recruitment agency. Petitioner was impleaded in the case one-and-a-half
years after the filing of MARS answer to the complaint. Hence, the failure of MARS to
prove the legality of Macarayas dismissal from employment should not mean that the
same burden should fall upon petitioner who was not even privy to Macarayas