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Dissenting Opinion
2
G.R. No. 224469
requires prior authority for any of the acts of cuttjng, gathering, collecting,
removing timber or other forest products even from those lands possessed by IPs
falling within the ambit of the statute's definition of private lands." This is
precisely what Section 77 of PD No. 705 seeks to penalize - the cutting of tree
sans authority. Nevertheless, the ponencia acquitted the petitioners based on
reasonable doubt that the dita tree was cut and collected without authority from
the State. It anchored the reasonable doubt on "the confusion arising from the new
legal developments, particularly, the recognition of the indigenous peoples' (IPs)
human rights normative system, in our country."
Regretfully, I respectfully dissent. Mere confusion brought about by the
legal developments should not be used as a basis to acquit the petitioners,
especially when it was not proven and shown, both from the literal text and the
intent of the law, that IPs are indeed exempted from PD No. 705.
Furthermore, I respectfully opine that the basis for the acquittal in Saguin v.
People, 3 does not merely rest on the confusion of the laws. The Court considered
the devolution of the functions of the hospital to the provincial government as the
legal basis for exonerating accused Saguin, et al. Since they had no more duty to
make the remittances, they could not be held liable under PD No. 1752, as
amended:
"By April 1, 1993, however, the RMDH had been devolved to the
Provincial or Local Government of Zamboanga del Norte. Thus, all financial
transactions of the hospital were carried out through the Office of the Provincial
Governor. The petitioners, therefore, had legal basis to believe that the duty to
set aside funds and to effect the HDMF remittances was transferred from the
hospital to the provincial government. Hence, the petitioners should not be
penalized for their failure to perform a duty which were no longer theirs and over
which they were no longer in control.
xxxx
The devolution of the hospital to the pn;winc}al government, therefore,
was a valid justification which constituted a lawful cause for the inability of
the petitioners to make the HDMF remittances for March 1993."4 (Emphases
supplied.)
As opposed to Saguin, here, it is not clear whether indigenous people have
legal basis to cut trees without permits, free from government regulation.
Ultimately, the case before us begs the resolution of the indispensable questionDoes the IPRA categorically and specifically grant in favor of indigenous people
the authority to cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products free
from criminal liability under PD No. 705?
I answer in the negative. To construe IPRA as a subset of the term
"authority" under Section 77 of the Revised Forestry Code will, in effect, make
IPRA an exception to the penal provisions of PD No. 705. While the IPRA
4
773 Phil. 614 (2015).
Id. at 627-628 (2015).