Decision - 56 - G.R. No. 227363 condition." It has been settled that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is different from what is complained of, or that a third person should act in concert with the accused. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child is coerced to engage in lascivious conduct. Meanwhile, Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen partly agrees with the ponencia that insertion of a finger into a: minor's vagina deserves a higher penalty than prision mayor under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC. However, he asserts that nonconsensual insertion of a finger in another's genitals is rape by carnal knowledge under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC. He also reiterates his view in People v. Quimvel that Article 336 of the RPC has already been rendered ineffective with the passage of R.A. No. 8353. We stand by our ruling in Caoili that the act of inserting a finger in another's genitals cannot be considered rape by carnal knowledge, thus: The language of paragraphs l and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. provides the clements that substantially differentiate the two forms of rape, i.e .. rape by sexual intercourse and rape by sexual assault. It is through legislative process that the dichotomy between these two modes of rape was created. To broaden the scope of rape by sexual assault, by eliminating its legal distinction from rape through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation which We cannot traverse without violating the principle of separation of powers. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of applying the I.aw as enacted by the Legislature. In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A. No. 8353. the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accmed of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the lattcr. 126 We also maintain the majority ruling in Quimvel that Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it were the intent of Congress, it would have expressly done so. Apropos is the following disquisition in Quimvel: x x x Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states: "deemed amended, modified, or repealed accordingly" qual(fies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of [RA 8353]." 126 Supra note 27, at 143. //