NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073 (1997). See also National Food Authority v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil.
241, 251 (2005); Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007); Rep. of the Phils. v.
Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 100 (2007); and Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) v. Phil. Gaming Jurisdiction Inc.
(PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. 547, 553 (2009).
[39] Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 (1995).
[40] Id.
[41] 623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009).
[42] Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 555.
[43] See Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 72 (1933), as cited in Tenchavez v. Escaño, et al., supra note 13,
at 762.
[44] See Assn. of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 808 (1989)
and Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 740 Phil. 403, 436 (2014).
[45] Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 597 (2004) as cited in Serrano
v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 436 (2009). See also Puno, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 100 (2010); Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Phil. Truth
Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 550 (2010); and Leonardo-De Castro, J., Concurring Opinion, Garcia v. Judge
Drilon, et al., 712 Phil. 44, 125 (2013).
[46] Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra.
[47] Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245, 282 (2009) and Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA 313, 360. See also
Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra; Velasco, Jr., J., Concurring
Opinion, International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Phils.), et al., 774 Phil. 508, 706 (2015); and Jardeleza, J., Concurring Opinion, Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1, 904.
[48] Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 45, at 553.
[49] See Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil.
531, 697-698 (2004) as cited by Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
supra note 45, at 553, and Leonen, J., Separate Opinion, Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017.
[50] Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245, 298 (2009).
[51] Id.
[52] Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Sps. Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 732 Phil. 1, 326- 327 (2014).
[53] To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:
1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions.
2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class. (See PAGCOR v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 660 Phil.
636, 648 [2011]; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, et al., 692 Phil. 114, 141-142 [2012]; Corpuz v.
People, 734 Phil. 353, 405 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277 (2015); Drugstores Association of
the Philippines, Inc. v. National Council on Disability Affairs, G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25,
55; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, November 8,
2016; and Mindanao Shopping Destination Corp. v. Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017).
[54] Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
[55] Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., supra note 13, as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13;; Llorente v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 13; and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at
730; Republic v. Iyoy supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, supra note 13. FAMILY CODE, Article
26 Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.
[56]
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do
so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)