1/4/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.[58] (Citations omitted) As its designation connotes, the clear and present danger test demands that the danger not only be clear, but also present. In contrast, the dangerous tendency test does not require that the danger be present. In In Re: Gonzales:[59] The term clear seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.[60] The clear and present danger test has undergone changes from its inception in Schenck v. U.S.,[61] where it was applied to speeches espousing anti- action.[62] In the 1951 case of Dennis v. U.S.,[63] the imminence requirement of the test was diminished. That case, which involved communist conspiracy, adopted Judge Learned Hand's framework, where it must be asked "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."[64] Nevertheless, in the 1969 case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,[65] the U.S. High Court not only restored the imminence requirement, but added "an intent requirement which according to a noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be punished."[66] As the prevailing standard, Brandenburg limits the clear and present danger test's application "to expression where there is 'imminent lawless action.'"[67] The Brandenburg standard was applied in Reyes v. Bagatsing.[68] In Reyes, this Court required the existence of grave and imminent danger to justify the procurement of permit for use of public streets. It held: By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/65669 32/60