E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly 12/19/21, 1:28 PM SP No. 58933. In the said petition, Korphil advanced the following arguments: In as much as the missing seaman's death cannot be proven, Mr. Pantollano cannot be presumed dead right away considering that the New Civil Code as well as the Rules of Court provide for a specific rule before a missing person can be properly presumed dead. We shall quote in full the said provision as follows: After an absence of seven (7) years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. xxxx Considering that Mr. Pantollano has been absent only for less than six (6) years, his death cannot be legally presumed. If Mr. Pantollano cannot be considered to have died at the time of his disappearance or cannot be legally presumed dead as of the present time by virtue of Article 390 of the Civil Code, public respondent NLRC cannot successfully apply the provision of Section 20 (A) (1) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract because the death of Mr. Pantollano indeed had never occurred. Even [if] a perspicacious, thorough and exhaustive perusal is made on the pertinent provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, this Honorable Court cannot find a provision which gives death compensation to a seafarer who had just disappeared or was merely declared as missing. In view of the fact that the death of the seaman was not duly proven and the period within which the missing seaman can be lawfully presumed dead has not been complied with, it becomes clear that public respondent NLRC indeed committed serious error when it affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter awarding death compensation to private respondent.[28] The CA dismissed the claim of Gliceria because the natural mother is not the beneficiary contemplated by law notwithstanding the fact that she was designated by her deceased son as the sole allottee and beneficiary. If there is any party entitled to the death compensation benefits, it is Vedasto's surviving spouse and children and not her mother. Gliceria thus filed a petition for review with this Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 157424. In a Resolution dated August 6, 2003, the Court denied the same for the failure of Gliceria to file the appeal within the extended period in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and for her failure to properly verify the petition in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7, since the verification is based on affiant's personal knowledge, information and belief, as a consequence of which the petition was treated as an unsigned pleading which under Section 3, Rule 7, produces no legal effect. But what is obvious is that in the earlier claim for compensation benefits filed by Gliceria, who wanted to arrogate unto herself the said benefits, Korphil was claiming that it was still premature because the death of Vedasto was not yet duly proven and the period that must elapse before a seaman can be lawfully presumed dead has not been complied with. Consequently, Korphil is estopped from insisting in this later case filed by Imelda that Vedasto should be considered dead from the time he went missing on August 2, 1994 and therefore the claim was filed beyond the allowable period of three years. https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/37942 Page 6 of 10