04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Vague propositions that the implementation of the assailed orders will work injustice and violate the rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the requisite standing. Neither would its status as a "people's organization" vest it with the legal standing to assail the validity of the executive orders.[14] La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,[15] which MDOI cites in support of its claim to legal standing, is inapplicable as it is not similarly situated with the therein petitioners who alleged personal and substantial injury resulting from the mining activities permitted by the assailed statute. And so is Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[16] for the indigenous peoples' leaders and organizations were not the petitioners therein, who necessarily had to satisfy the locus standi requirement, but were intervenors who sought and were allowed to be impleaded, not to assail but to defend the constitutionality of the statute. Moreover, MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance to justify a relaxation of the rule on legal standing. To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita[17] requires that the following elements must be established: (1) the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The presence of these elements MDOI failed to establish, much less allege. Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando[18] more specifically declares that the transcendental importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of the petition. This Court, not being a venue for the ventilation of generalized grievances, must thus deny adjudication of the matters raised by MDOI. Now, on AMIN's position. AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression of the principle of separation of powers. Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and the Judiciary may not encroach on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit.[19] AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes,[20] they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders. While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President [21] who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, [22] it posits that this broad power of control including the power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty [23] of the President to ensure that the elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/44257 5/15