testimony of Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of such physical injuries is not indispensable to petitioner's conviction or acquittal. Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an element of the crime that petitioner was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking, unnecessary. In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress. The clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done on her as well as to the mental and emotional suffering she experienced as a result thereof, suffices to prove such facts. The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to have led to her mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the information in the case at bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the absence thereof or lack of proof of such injuries would not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence or physical injuries, in isolation, are not elements of this particular crime. As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the causation of non-physical suffering, that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor on the offended party, and not of direct bodily harm or property damage which are covered by the other subsections of the law's provision. The use of physical violence, whether or not it causes physical or property harm to the victim, falls under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and proven to have caused mental or emotional anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are similarly covered only if they lead to such psychological harm. Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of mental or emotional harm, are punishable under the other provisions of the law. As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, or even the complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to petitioner Dinamling's acquittal. Like the physical injuries that was discussed above, the fact of AAA's miscarriage or incomplete abortion is not essential to proving the elements of the crime, unless it is alleged to have caused mental or emotional suffering. It is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it is not abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at the time of commission which is an aggravating circumstance, not an element, of the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads: SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules: xxxx (f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor. If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.