Agoy vs NLRC : 112096 : January 30, 1996 : J Francisco : Third Division http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/112096.htm Neither do we subscribe to the conclusion that petitioner voluntarily consented to his dismissal despite his signature in the letter of termination dated April 2, 1990, indicating assent to his termination from service for failing to qualify for the position and releasing private respondents from all claims and liabilities. In our jurisprudence, quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor, particularly those executed by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities.19 The fact that petitioner signed his notice of termination and failed to make any outright objection thereto did not altogether mean voluntariness on his part. Neither did the execution of a final settlement and receipt of the amounts agreed upon foreclose his right to pursue a legitimate claim for illegal dismissal. Expounding on the reasons therefor, the following pronouncements are in point: In labor jurisprudence, it is well established that quitclaims and/or complete releases executed by the employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims arising from the unfair labor practice of the employer. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and therefore, null and void. The acceptance of termination pay does not divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts. (Cario vs. ACCFA, L-19808, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183; Philippine Sugar Institute vs. CIR, L-13475, September 29, 1960, 109 Phil. 452; Mercury Drug Co., Inc. vs. CIR, L-23357, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 694, 704). In the Cario case, supra, the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Sanchez, said: Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners did not relent their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived any of their rights. Renuntiationon praesumitur. (Italics supplied)20 Moreover, it is noteworthy that petitioner lost no time in immediately pursuing his claim against private respondents by filing his complaint for illegal dismissal a month after being repatriated on April 2, 1990. This is hardly expected from someone who voluntarily consented to his dismissal, thus, completely negating the conclusion that petitioners consent was given freely and bolstering the claim that the same was obtained through force and intimidation. It must be emphasized that in termination cases like the one at bench, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for just cause, and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.21 As already elaborated above, private respondents failed to justify petitioners dismissal, thereby rendering it illegal. Resultingly, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC to reverse its previous decision and uphold petitioners dismissal despite convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequent to his illegal dismissal, petitioner is therefore entitled to the amount of SR39,674.00 - representing his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract22 as adjudged in the NLRCs December 9, 1992 decision. However, anent petitioners claim for additional compensation (detailed and prayed for in his motion for reconsideration), we find no reason to award the same for being speculative and without any proper legal and factual basis. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of respondent NLRC dated September 22, 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision dated December 9, 1992 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. 5 of 6 1/20/2016 8:48 PM