may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its own. Thus, although a motion may be heard on short notice (i.e., less than three days after it is filed) it must be for good cause shown. In this case, respondent judge defends her decision to hear the motion of the accused for the recall of the warrant of arrest on the same day it was filed on the ground that anyway the public prosecutor was present. This is not a good reason for hearing the motion on short notice. Of course the opposing party must be served a copy of the motion. But the question is whether he was given sufficient time to prepare for the hearing. That the public prosecutor was present was a mere happenstance. In fact he asked for fifteen (15) days to comment on the motion to recall the order of arrest against the accused because obviously he was unprepared. Indeed the failure to observe the three-day notice rule is not excused by the fact that parties happen to be present. The only excuse for dispensing with it is if the matter to be heard is urgent. In this case a hearing on the previous motion of the accused for reinvestigation and their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest was set the next day, December 14, 1995. There is no reason why the matter could not just wait for that hearing during which respondent could have also heard the motion to recall the warrant of arrest. After all, the grounds for the two motions were substantially the same. That the accused might have appeared to respondent judge to be innocent of the charges, as indeed the case against them was subsequently dismissed, was no reason for respondent judge to resort to procedural shortcuts. Third. Respondent judge contends that complainants motion for reconsideration of the order of December 13, 1995 recalling the warrant of arrest did not have the conformity of the public prosecutor. This is another matter, however. The question here is whether respondent judge delayed the dispositions of complainants motion for reconsideration. Moreover, complainant, through the private prosecutor, had been allowed to intervene. While his intention was subject to the supervision of the public prosecutor, it cannot be said that opposition to the recall of the warrant of arrest was something the public prosecutor did not like. The fact is that he asked for time to oppose or at least comment on the motion to recall the warrant of arrest. Fourth. As already stated, the OCA finds no evidence to hold respondent clerk of court administratively liable. Indeed, the only act she is accused of is that of convincing complainant to attend the hearing by respondent clerk of court. If he appealed in court on December 13, 1995 it was because he had decided to. His decision was voluntary. Considering the foregoing, as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, the Court finds respondent judge GUILTY of misconduct and hereby REPRIMANDS her, with warning that repetition of the same conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. The complaint against respondent clerk of court is dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.