5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Simbajon’s POEA-SEC shows that the period of his employment with NCL is for ten months.[71] His contract effectively started on July 21, 2004 – the date he boarded NCL’s vessel. Thus, his contract should have only ended on May 17, 2005 or 300 days from his embarkation. Simbajon was subsequently declared fit to resume work on February 2, 2005. Hence, he should have been taken back by petitioners since he still had 104 days left before his contract’s expiration. But as alleged by Simbajon, he was not hired again. He contended that his non-rehiring shows that his disability was really permanent and total.[72] We find this contention untenable. We can only surmise petitioners’ reasons for not reemploying Simbajon despite the effectivity of his contract. However, we cannot accept his argument that his nonrehiring translates to the permanent and total character of his disability. For one, we have already determined that his DM Type II was not a work-related disease for failure to comply with the POEA-SEC’s requisites for compensability. Not being work-related, it cannot be the basis of any disability claims. The findings of Simbajon’s chosen physician cannot also be considered due to the absence of the medical opinion of a third independent physician. We further note that this argument was only raised in Simbajon’s motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. This was never reiterated in his pleadings with the CA and in his comment to the present petition. At the very least, Simbajon could have used his non-rehiring to support the argument that his contract was prematurely terminated by petitioners. He was declared fit to work but he was not reaccepted in his former or a similar position despite the remaining 104 days in his contract. But Simbajon never made an issue out of this. Even at the level of the labor tribunals, his pleadings focused solely on the classification of his disability as permanent and total. Premature contract termination and entitlement to permanent and total disability benefits are two different labor issues. One is based on the untimely termination of the contract without any just or valid cause, while the other is on the compensation that the law aims to give to seafarers who are rendered unable to resume sea service due to work-related disease. Thus, we cannot rule that Simbajon’s contract had been pre-terminated without any just or valid cause, and hold him entitled to payment of his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract.[73] Otherwise we would be violating petitioners’ due process rights. Petitioners never controverted such claim precisely because Simbajon never raised it as an issue. Moreover, the CA and the labor tribunals’ rulings never touched on this. Hence, it is beyond the ambit of our review. On a final note, this Court would like to point out the amendments made of the POEASEC which now provides: elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/57289 11/16