The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission. The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused. Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces. We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof. At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop. Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.142 Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.145 The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright. The corroborative testimonies of MMM and OOO are worthy of credence. The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially