withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional. Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x." The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted) By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103 III. Marital Rape in the Philippines Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105 In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook: (a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle; (b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;