SMOKE AND FUMES “[M]an has a time window of five to ten years before the need for hard decisions regarding changes in energy strategies might become critical.” — JAMES BLACK, 1978 1978-1979. The report acknowledges “[t]here is no doubt that increases in fossil fuel usage and decreases in forest cover are aggravating the potential problem of increased CO2 in the atmosphere.”117 Significantly, the memo expressed the view that Exxon possessed the technology to dramatically reduce emissions, but that doing so would result in an unacceptable increase in costs. By 1981, Exxon had internally acknowledged the risks of climate change and the role fossil fuel combustion played in increasing carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere. A position memo from Henry Shaw in May 1981 includes as Exxon’s current position on the CO2 greenhouse effect that a three degree increase in average temperatures will result in a ten degree increase at the poles, “[m]ajor shifts in rainfall/ agriculture,” and that “[p]olar ice may melt.”118 By 1982, any lingering doubts were put to rest by a memo from Roger Cohen, then Director of Exxon’s Theoretical and Mathematical Sciences Laboratory. In this memo, Cohen noted that “a clear scientific consensus had emerged regarding the expected climatic effects of increased atmospheric CO2.”119 This consensus determined that doubling “[In] summary, the results of our research are in accord with the scientific consensus on the effect of increased atmospheric CO2 on climate.” — ROGER COHEN, 1982 atmospheric CO2 would result in a global temperature increase of three degrees Celsius, plus or minus 1.5 degrees Celsius.120 In this memo, Cohen also acknowledged the work of a scientist who believed increased water evaporation and cloud cover would suppress global temperature increases. Cohen concluded, however, that this analysis was consistent with predictions that atmospheric temperature increases would be nonuniformly distributed across the globe, with little warming at the equator and greatest warming at the poles. He concludes that, “[in] summary, the results of our research are in accord with the scientific consensus on the effect of increased atmospheric CO2 on climate.”121 Later that year, on November 12, 1982, Exxon circulated a 43-page climate change primer to several members of Exxon management to “familiarize Exxon personnel with the subject.”122 By this point, Exxon was fully aware and internally acknowledging that climate change was real, caused by burning fossil fuels, and would have significant impacts on the environment and human health and wellbeing. As Early as the 1970s and No Later than the 1980s, Climate Change Projections Were Being Used in Business and Operational Planning Internal documents uncovered by the Los Angeles Times and the Columbia School of Journalism demonstrate that by the mid-1980s, Exxon was incorporating climate change projections into its Arctic operations planning while discounting the risks when communicating with the public.123 In 1986, a team of researchers led by Ken Croasdale of Imperial oil, an Exxon subsidiary, was “trying to determine how global warming could affect Exxon’s Arctic operations and its bottom line.” In 1991, Croasdale reported to an engineering conference that “[c]ertainly any major development with a life span of say 30-40 years will need to assess the impacts of potential global warming,” and that “[t]his is particularly true of 15 Arctic and offshore projects in Canada, where warming will clearly affect sea ice, icebergs, permafrost, and sea levels.”124 Similarly, evidence uncovered by The Guardian demonstrates that Shell was also directly put on notice of climate risks and incorporating those risks into planning. A 1986 report seen by The “Certainly any major development with a life span of say 30-40 years will need to assess the impacts of potential global warming…This is particularly true of Arctic and offshore projects in Canada, where warming will clearly affect sea ice, icebergs, permafrost, and sea levels.” — KEN CROASDALE, 1986 Guardian addressed the issue directly. The report “notes the large uncertainties in climate science at the time but nonetheless states: ‘the changes may be the greatest in recorded history.’”125 Later, in 1989, Shell Oil announced that it was redesigning a $3 billion natural gas platform it had been designing for use in the North Sea.126 The original design had the platform sitting 30 meters above the ocean’s surface, but the redesign would raise the platform by one to two meters to account for rising sea levels as a result of global warming.127 This evidence of early action to protect industry assets from climate change should be considered a baseline for further investigation into both prior and subsequent industry conduct. Anecdotal evidence, including interviews with longtime industry insiders, strongly suggests the oil and gas industry may have begun accounting for climate change in the design of its own infrastructure far earlier than the 1980s. In a filmed interview with one of the authors of the present report, a long-time oil industry engineer reported that he had been instructed to plan for melting permafrost in the design and construction pads for the TransAlaska Pipeline in the early 1970s.128 A second