Avantgarde paid all his hospital bills and promised to work out his sickness benefit with Sembawang as soon as he was declared fit to work. Petitioner was required to rest, and he received treatment until early 1997. On September 11, 1997, petitioner was declared fit to work. On December 24, 1997, petitioner asked Avantgarde to pay his sickness benefits. On January 6, 1998, Avantgarde replied that it could no longer act on petitioners claim as he had deviated from the legal procedure and, should he wish, he could personally follow-up with Sembawang. On March 4, 1998 and May 5, 1998, petitioner wrote a letter to Sembawang regarding his claim. Sembawang did not reply. On March 2, 2001, petitioner lodged a complaint for payment of disability benefits and other money claims against the respondents with the Regional Arbitration Board. The labor arbiter dismissed the case without prejudice, stating that the action had already prescribed.[4] On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) likewise ruled that petitioners cause of action had prescribed as a mere letter of demand would not toll the prescriptive period for filing the complaint. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner, after moving for extension of thirty days from April 16, 2002 to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, filed the petition on May 15, 2002. On May 23, 2002, the appellate court denied the motion for extension on the ground that only a maximum of fifteen days extension is allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and extreme work pressure is not a compelling reason. On July 9, 2002, it also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner now comes before us raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ISSUING ITS FIRST CHALLENGED ORDER DATED MAY 27, 2002 [should be May 23, 2002], DENYING PETITIONERS URGENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND LATER DENYING HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THE SECOND CHALLENGED ORDER DATED JULY 9, 2002 ON PURELY TECHNICAL GROUNDS. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION, IN SO DOING DENYING THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE INHERENT MERITS OF HIS CAUSE, THAT IS: