liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.xxi[21] The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to remember the Courts ruling in In re Almacen,xxii[22] which we quote: x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x (emphasis ours) We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent. First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision, despite knowing that it had already become final and executory. The IBP investigating commissioner had no explicit finding on this point. Rogelio G. Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the appeal, his company had received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led him to the conlcusion that they [had] lost the case before the Supreme Court.xxiii[23] This, however, does not substantiate the charge. Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioners failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on. Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained from complainant the amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it was needed for the appeal before this Court. According to Gatchalian,xxiv[24] respondent explained that the amount would cover all the expenses to be incurred in the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount also will answer for the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be given or paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be garnished.xxv[25] Corroborating Gatchalians testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received the amount on the representation that it would be paid to the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano case.xxvi[26]