adjudication of the custody of children in accordance with Article 78 of the Muslim Code; recovery of the dower by the
wife from the husband; continuation of the husband's obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67; and the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, if stipulated in the marriage settlements. [19]
Jurisdiction over actions for divorce is vested upon the Shari'a Circuit Courts,[20] whose decisions may be appealed to
the Shari'a District Courts.[21] Under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts,[22] an appeal must be made
within a reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of judgment.[23] The judgment shall become final and executory
after the expiration of the period to appeal,[24] or upon decision of the Shari'a District Courts on appeal from
the Shari'a Circuit Court.[25]
The effect of a final judgment is stated under Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to
civil proceedings in Shari'a Courts.[26] Paragraph (a) thereof provides:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to
the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a
will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The provision embodies the principle of res judicata in judgments in rem. Suits that affect the personal status of a
person are in the nature of proceedings in rem. Divorce suits fall under this category, and divorce decrees are
considered judgments in rem.[27] Final judgments in rem bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and anyone in the world who has a right to be heard
on the strength of alleged facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest. [28] Simply put, a judgment in rem is
binding upon the whole world.
As a rule, a judgment could not be collaterally impeached or called in question if rendered in a court of competent
jurisdiction, but must be properly attacked in a direct action. [29] A collateral attack is defined as an attack, made as an
incident in another action, whose purpose is to obtain a different relief.[30] This is proper only when the judgment, on
its face, is null and void, as where it is patent that the court which rendered said judgment has no jurisdiction. [31] But
"[w]here a court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, its judgment, x x x is conclusive, as long as it
remains unreversed and in force, and cannot be impeached collaterally." [32]
The reason for the general rule against a collateral attack on a judgment of a court having jurisdiction is that public
policy forbids an indirect collateral contradiction or impeachment of such a judgment. It is not a mere technicality, but
is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice which should be followed by all courts. [33]
With respect to the divorce between Zamoranos and De Guzman, the Decree of Divorce was issued on June 18,
1992 by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul, who was the presiding judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court, Third Shari'a District,
Isabela, Basilan.[34] It states that both Zamoranos and De Guzman appeared when the case was called for hearing. It
further recites that both parties converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding, and that it was
Zamoranos who sought divorce by tafwid, with De Guzman having previously delegated his authority to
exercise talaq.[35] Thus, on its face, the divorce appears valid, having been issued for a cause recognized under the
applicable law by a competent court having jurisdiction over the parties. And, as neither party interposed an appeal,
the divorce has attained finality.
Given the foregoing, we agree with the CA that the Decree of Divorce cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. It is
evident that Pacasum's persistence in pursuing the administrative case against Zamoranos on the sole ground of
bigamy is premised on the supposition that the latter's marriage with De Guzman was still subsisting when she
contracted marriage with Pacasum, which effectively challenges the Shari'a Circuit Court's divorce judgment. As we
have noted, however, the judgment of the court is valid on its face; hence, a collateral attack in this case is not
allowed. The collateral unassailability of the divorce is a necessary consequence of its finality. It "cannot now be
changed in any proceeding; and much less is it subject to the collateral attack which is here made upon it." [36] As no
appeal was taken with respect to the divorce decree, it must be conceded to have full force and effect. [37] The decree,
insofar as it affects the civil status of Zamoranos, has therefore become res judicata, subject to no collateral attack.
Furthermore, the proscription against collateral attacks similarly applies to matters involving the civil status of