were his refusal to take orders from his superior on January 6 and his leaving the vessel without permission on January 13. When petitioner remained silent, the committee informed him that he was dismissed. He was sent home that same day. Petitioner was not given reasonable time to answer the charges hurled against him or to defend himself. The notice apprising him of the charges and the notice of dismissal were done in one morning all in the January 14 committee hearing. The submission that the entry in the logbook made on January 6 which stated that for petitioners refusal to take orders from the master of the ship he will be sent home in first possible port was sufficient compliance of the first notice requirement is not well-taken. This is not the kind of notice that satisfies due process contemplated by law. In such a case where there is a failure to comply with the requirements of the law as to the notice and hearing, the dismissal is certainly tainted with illegality. On the substantive issue, we find no just cause for petitioners dismissal. According to the POEA, petitioner was found guilty for insubordination for his refusal to obey the order of the master to prepare the victual statement on January 6, 1993,vi[6] which was presumably for the month of January. The NLRC, which simply adopted in toto the findings of the POEA, concluded that complainant refused albeit in a bad manner the request of the Shipmaster to prepare a correct victualling cost statement for the month of December. Based on the POEA findings, petitioner was dismissed because of his refusal to prepare the victualling statement for the month of January, 1993. The facts as found by the POEA are all muddled up. The victualling cost statement for the month of January was not yet due when he was asked to prepare the same on January 6 of that month. A victualling cost statement was necessary to show the food expense incurred for the past month, not for the present month. Thus, from the victualling statements submitted for the month of October, November and December, 1992, it can be seen that the period indicated therein began on the first day of each month and ended on the last day of said month. This means that the report for October was made in November, for November in December, and that for December in January. Such being the case, petitioners refusal to prepare the victualling statement of January was justified since the victualling cost for the month of January was not yet due or necessary. On the other hand, the NLRCs conclusion that petitioner refused to correct the victualling statement for the month of December as ordered to, was also not sufficient basis for his dismissal. There is no doubt that petitioner had complied with his superiors orders to prepare the statement for December. It was only the correction of the December statement that he requested to defer which the Shipmaster took as a downright refusal to make and considered such act as a serious and gross insubordination. For willful disobedience to be considered as just cause for dismissal, the employees conduct must be willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to discharge.vii[7]