4/29/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly agreed pretermination to mean that the seafarer had contracted illness aboard the ship. In contrast, respondent can only rely on the element of proximity to deduce that Armando suffered the fatal illness during his service. Secondly, neither the LA nor the NLRC made a factual determination of Armando’s actual work as an Able Seaman. Respondent’s website definition of an Able Seaman was not even recognized in the NLRC Decision. Hence, at the level of the labor tribunals, there was already no premise on which to base the conclusion that Armando’s work involved considerable exposure to the risks of contracting lung cancer. Nevertheless, on certiorari, the CA held that there was a reasonable connection between the job of Armando and his lung disease. It even stated that it was undisputed[35] that he had worked in the cargo section of the vessel. The CA’s appreciation is manifestly erroneous. A plain reading of the pleadings on record will easily reveal that the parties vehemently contested the actual job description of Armando. Petitioners claimed that he worked with the deck contingent, while respondent asserted that he was assigned to the ship’s cargo. These conflicting contentions were not resolved by either the LA or the NLRC. Therefore, since the CA proceeded from a disputed and unresolved factual claim, its resulting inference on the work connection may be disregarded. Indeed, no ruling shall be rendered by any court without clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts on which the ruling is based.[36] In any event, even if it were proven that Armando worked in the cargo section of the ship, the CA must still find justification for how his work environment caused his constant headaches, whether he recovered from his ailment,[37] and how it worsened into the alleged fatal illness.[38] This explanation need not show a direct causal connection; but positive propositions[39] on employment factors like age, position, actual work, dietary provisions,[40] exposure to substances,[41] and possibility of recovery[42] have been considered by the Court as adequate in compensation proceedings. In this instance, the NLRC and the CA failed to discuss the employment conditions that had led to the ailment of Armando. Thirdly, for respondents to be entitled to death benefits under Section 32-A of the POEA Contract, the CA must further find that the alleged work- related illness of Armando caused his death. At most, based on the allegations of respondent, Armando claimed to have suffered from constant headaches aboard M/V Magellan. However, there was no determination of the link between his ailment (headaches) and his cause of death (lung cancer). In Medline Management, Inc. v. Roslinda[43] citing Hermogenes v. OSCO Shipping Services, Inc.[44] and Gau Sheng Phil., Inc. v. Joaquin,[45] we have discussed death arising from a seafarer’s illness in this wise: Indeed, the death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that: (a) the seaman died of the same elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/56149 8/13