As succinctly observed by the NLRC ". . . The preponderance of evidence indicates that complainant was repatriated due to an illness sustained during the period of his employment with the respondent. Moreover, it was sufficiently established that respondent's physician already knew, as early as June 1989, or the existence of the complainant's pacemaker. This is, indeed, precisely the reason why he was asked to submit a medical certificate to the effect that he could do normal physical activities. (p. 3 of Administrator's Decision; Rollo, p., 141)[10] Msesm In our view, there is no merit in petitioners' suggestion that private respondent did not make a full disclosure of his medical history. The records reveal that private respondent was deployed by petitioners twice already. The first was in 1989. When his contract was completed, petitioners without any hitch again deployed him, despite of the fact that he had already undergone pacemaker surgery in 1986. Twice, private respondent underwent the required medical and physical examination. Twice, he was certified physically fit by the petitioners' own accredited physician. Twice, too, he was hired and deployed by them. All these clearly belie the allegation of misrepresentation and nondisclosure. Petitioners cannot now deny the sickness and disability benefits private respondent deserves. Petitioners aver that the illness of the private respondent was not contracted during his employment nor was it aggravated by his work. They relied on Kirit, Sr., et al. vs. GSIS, 187 SCRA 224, 226 (1990), which says that presumptions of compensability and aggravation have been abandoned under the compensation scheme in the present Labor Code. It will be noted that the claim for sickness and permanent disability benefits of the private respondent arose from the stipulations on the standard format contract of employment between him and petitioner Seagull per Circular No. 2, Series of 1984 of POEA. This circular was intended for all parties involved in the employment of Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel. Significantly, under the contract, compensability of the illness or death of seamen need not depend on whether the illness was work connected or not.[11] It is sufficient that the illness occurred during the term of the employment contract. It will also be recalled that petitioners admitted that private respondent's work as a radio officer exposed him to different climates and unpredictable weather, which could trigger a heart attack or heart failure. [12] Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him of compensation benefits. For what matters is that his work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death.[13] Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees,