1/5/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo: Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard. Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive: We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted ) In addition, We find that the petitioners did not sleep on their rights and simply allowed the 60-day period from the denial of the First Motion for Reconsideration to lapse. Rather, petitioners filed the Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC in order to secure the necessary certification from their Foreign Adoption Agencies and/or Embassies which would reflect that since they are not residents in their countries and are residing in the Philippines, the said agencies could not issue the documents required by the domestic courts in support of their Petition for Adoption. The foregoing effort of petitioners was not meant to cause a delay on the proceeding but to actually assist the court in the speedy disposal of the case. Second, petitioners assert that respondent Judge erred in referring the Petition for Adoption to the ICAB since said Petition was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. They claim that the Domestic Adoption Act clearly confers jurisdiction on Family Courts to hear adoption cases filed by aliens who have been residing in the Philippines for at least three continuous years.[28] Petitioners point out that contrary to the pronouncement of the RTC, the instant case is not appropriate for inter-country adoption proceedings because the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995[29] applies to aliens who permanently reside abroad. However, in the instant case, petitioners do not permanently reside in the U.S. They have been residing in the Philippines for more than three continuous years prior to the filing of their Petition for Adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption Act. To support their https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/65992 5/13