Thus, I submit that the accused, in the first instance, should only be held liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. Prescinding from the above considerations, Petitioner, for the second instance, was correctly charged and convicted for a violation of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, because, this time, the child, at the time the act complained of was committed, already qualifies as one subjected to "other sexual abuse" thereby furnishing the essential element for a conviction under Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. Considering that the specific class of lascivious conduct in Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 requires allegation that the acts were performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, I respectfully submit that insofar as the first incident of July 2010 is concerned, the facts of the case warrant Petitioner's conviction only for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. Inasmuch as the child was already subjected to "other sexual abuse" at the time the second sexual affront occurred on November 30, 2010, I raise no objection to Petitioner's conviction for violation of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, insofar as the second incident is concerned. Endnotes: 1 G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017. 2 Id. FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 225608, March 13, 2017 ] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR AND JOEL ANGELES Y DE