reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, as well as to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 in damages for each count. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, albeit correcting the appellation of the crime to "violations of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610," reduced the award of moral damages to P25,000.00 and ordered Petitioner to pay a fine in the amount of P15,000.00 for each count of sexual abuse. With due respect, I maintain my position as elucidated in my Dissenting Opinion in Quimvel v. People,1 that a person may only be convicted of a violation of Article 336 in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 upon allegation and proof of the unique circumstances of the child-that is, that the child is "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse". Conversely, the higher penalty of reclusion temporal, in the range that the ponencia holds to be applicable in this case, is not automatically applicable and may only be justified if it is alleged and proved that the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, for money, profit, or any other consideration. Applying the foregoing standards, it is my position that insofar as the first Information (pertaining to the July 2010 incident against AAA) is concerned, Petitioner cannot be convicted for violation of Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 and consequently suffer a penalty of reclusion temporal as provided for in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, precisely because, as illustrated in my Dissenting Opinion in Quimvel,2 a first sexual affront, on its own, cannot be automatically considered a violation of Section 5(b), absent a showing that the child is already a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" at the time the sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct was committed, or that the circumstances prior to or during the act of complained of already constitutes the first instance of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct so as to convert the child into a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Here, the record is bereft of any allegation or proof that when the July 2010 incident took place, AAA was already a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse"; neither is there any fact from which inference can be made that the relationship between the Petitioner and the victim amounts to coercion or influence.