Commission’s mandate and international law make it clear that the Commission does have jurisdiction to investigate actions by the respondents. APF and GANHRI’s brief explains that the use of the term jurisdiction is not limited to courts of law but instead it is commonly applied to any body that exercises governmental powers, such as courts or administrative authorities. 26 Their brief further asserts that it is a wellestablished principle of international law that a state may exercise jurisdiction over natural or legal persons in its territory or abroad, as long as there is a clear “connecting factor” or “nexus” between that state and the person or conduct. 27 APF and GANHRI’s brief notes how States’ prescriptive (i.e. the power to create, amend, or repeal legislation) and adjudicative (i.e. the ability of national courts, tribunals, or other bodies exercising judicial functions to hear and decide on matters) jurisdiction are not territorially limited to acts occurring within a state, whereas States’ enforcement (i.e. the state’s right to enforce legislation, for example, by using powers of arrest and investigation) jurisdiction typically is.28 The respondents’ submissions erroneously conflate these different forms of jurisdictions, and, on this basis, reach inaccurate conclusions. For example, Cemex and Shell, selectively cite the Permanent Court of International Justice’s 1927 Lotus case judgement, referring solely to enforcement jurisdiction. On other forms of jurisdiction, however, the Lotus judgement says: Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable. This discretion left to States by international law explains the great variety of rules which they have been able to adopt without objections or complaints on the part of other States…. 29 APF and GANHRI’s brief notes how the Lotus judgement makes it clear that states have wide discretion to extend the reach of their prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction, provided that a clear nexus exists. It further notes that State practice reflects this interpretation: in an ever more globalized world, states increasingly exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially. 30 APF and GANHRI emphasize that even the territorial principle does not preclude States from regulating or adjudicating over conduct that is wholly or partially carried outside their territory.31 The subjective territorial principle allows States to exercise jurisdiction over activities committed within that State, even if completed abroad. The objective territorial principle allows a State to exercise jurisdiction over activities that are completed within its 26 See, e.g., Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 145, 178 (1975). See APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 4 n. 2. 27 See APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 9 (and references cited therein). 28 See id., at ¶ 10. 29 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J., (Ser. A) No. 10, para. 19 (Sept. 1927) [hereinafter S.S. Lotus case]. 30 Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 818 (2009). 31 See APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶¶ 17-22. 15