4/30/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Section 1 provides in relevant part, viz: “. . . If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.” Petitioner thus timely filed his petition with the Court of Appeals on June 9, 1999. We now proceed to decide the case on the merits. The issue is whether or not the claim of the petitioner has prescribed. The applicable law is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz: “Article 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employeremployee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.” (emphasis supplied) The pivotal question is when petitioner's cause of action accrued for this will determine the reckoning date of the three-year prescriptive period. Petitioner contends that his cause of action accrued only in 1993 when respondent A.P. Moller wrote to him that its accounting records showed it had no outstanding money orders and that his case was considered outdated. Thus, the three (3) year prescriptive period should be counted from 1993 and not 1978 and since his complaint was filed in 1994, he claims that it has not prescribed. We agree. Petitioner's cause of action accrued in November 1993 upon respondent Maersk's definite denial of his money claims following this Court's ruling in the similar case of Baliwag Transit , Inc. v. Ople.[10] In that case, a bus of the petitioner Baliwag Transit bus company driven by the respondent driver figured in an accident with a train of the Philippine National Railways (PNR) on August 10, 1974. This resulted to the death of eighteen (18) passengers and caused serious injury to fifty-six (56) other passengers. The bus itself also sustained extensive damage. The bus company instituted a complaint against the PNR. The latter was held liable for its negligence in the decision rendered on April 6, 1977. The respondent driver was absolved of any contributory negligence. However, the driver was also prosecuted for multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries, but the case was provisionally dismissed in March 1980 for failure of the prosecution witness to appear at the scheduled hearing. Soon after the PNR decision was rendered, the driver renewed his license and sought reinstatement with Baliwag Transit. He was advised to wait until his criminal case was terminated. He repeatedly requested for reinstatement thereafter, but to no avail, even after termination of the criminal case against him. Finally, on May 2, 1980, he demanded reinstatement in a letter signed by his counsel. On May 10, 1980, petitioner Baliwag Transit replied that he could not be reinstated as his driver's license had already been revoked and his driving was "extremely dangerous to https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/52537 6/9

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