Moreover, a contract of employment is imbued with public interest. The Court has time and time again reminded parties that they "are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other." 31 Also, while a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law that regulate such contracts are deemed included and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties.32 Basic in our jurisprudence is the principle that when there is no showing of any clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.33 Awards for Damages Justified Finally, moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad faith or constitutes an act oppressive to labor or is done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. 34 Awards for moral and exemplary damages would be proper if the employee was harassed and arbitrarily dismissed by the employer.35 In affirming the awards of moral and exemplary damages, we quote with approval the following ratiocination of the labor arbiter: "The records also show that [respondent’s] dismissal was effected by [petitioners’] capricious and high-handed manner, anti-social and oppressive, fraudulent and in bad faith, and contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. Bad faith and fraud are shown in the acts committed by [petitioners] before, during and after [respondent’s] dismissal in addition to the manner by which she was dismissed. First, [respondent] was pressured to resign for two different and contradictory reasons, namely, cost-cutting and the need for a Chinese[-]speaking credit officer, for which no written advice was given despite complainant’s request. Such wavering stance or vacillating position indicates bad faith and a dishonest purpose. Second, she was employed on account of her qualifications, experience and readiness for the position of credit officer and pressured to resign a month after she was commended for her good work. Third, the demand for [respondent’s] instant resignation on 19 April 1999 to give way to her replacement who was allegedly reporting soonest, is whimsical, fraudulent and in bad faith, because on 16 April 1999 she was given a period of [sic] until 15 May 1999 within which to leave. Fourth, the pressures made on her to resign were highly oppressive, anti-social and caused her absolute torture, as [petitioners] disregarded her situation as an overseas worker away from home and family, with no prospect for another job. She was not even provided with a return trip fare. Fifth, the notice of termination is an utter manifestation of bad faith and whim as it totally disregards [respondent’s] right to security of tenure and due process. Such notice together with the demands for [respondent’s] resignation contravenes the fundamental guarantee and public policy of the Philippine government on security of tenure. "[Respondent] likewise established that as a proximate result of her dismissal and prior demands for resignation, she suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation. Her standing in the social and business community as well as prospects for employment with other entities have been adversely affected by her dismissal. [Petitioners] are thus liable for moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. xxxxxxxxx "[Petitioners] likewise acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating [respondent’s] employment and are therefore liable for exemplary damages. This should served [sic] as protection to other employees of [petitioner] company, and by way of example or correction for the public good so that persons similarly minded as [petitioners] would be deterred from committing the same acts." 36 The Court also affirms the award of attorney’s fees. It is settled that when an action is instituted for the recovery of wages, or when employees are forced to litigate and consequently incur expenses to protect their rights and interests, the grant of attorney’s fees is legally justifiable.37 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 9-31. 2 Id., pp. 33-56. Tenth Division. Penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (chairman and now a member of this Court), with the concurrence of Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Danilo B. Pine (members). 3 Id., pp. 59-60. 4 Id., pp. 75-91. 5 Id., pp. 62-74.