4/9/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly POEA-SEC quoted in the assailed decision of the CA, which enumerates the three (3) conditions for a cardiovascular disease to be considered compensable. This is in view of the CA’s conclusion that Taok complied with the third condition and that his ailments are cardiovascular in nature. This Court observed that the CA’s appreciation of the case is different from that of the NLRC and that of LA Salinas. Particularly, the CA deemed it appropriate to award total and permanent disability benefits to Taok because atrial fibrillation and cardiomyopathy are cardiovascular diseases and the evidence on record sufficiently proved the existence of one of the conditions stated in Paragraph 11, Section 32-A of the POEASEC. The CA stressed that under this particular condition, Taok’s illnesses are presumed to be work-related based on the undisputed fact that Taok manifested the symptoms while he was in the performance of his duties. On the other hand, while the labor tribunals resolved the issue of whether Taok’s illnesses are compensable under the provisions of the POEA-SEC, it is apparent that the dismissal of Taok’s complaint is primarily based on its supposed lack of a cause of action. They held that the duty to pay total and permanent disability benefits will not arise in the absence of a finding of disability by the company-designated physician and Taok’s opinion that his medical condition had rendered him unfit for sea duty is not the kind of assessment contemplated and acceptable under the POEA-SEC. The CA did not rule on the issue of whether NLRC was correct in holding that the determination of the company-designated physician is necessary for a cause of action for total and permanent disability benefits to arise. As far as the CA is concerned, Taok acquired a cause of action for total and permanent disability benefits when he became symptomatic while on sea duty, subsequently diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and cardiomyopathy by the company-designated physician, then repatriated and under treatment by the company-designated physician. That there was no declaration by the company-designated physician that Taok is totally and permanently disabled is inconsequential. Taok is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. This Court finds the CA to have committed a serious error in this regard. The NLRC and LA Salinas did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Taok’s complaint that would warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/55036 10/15