04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly (by taking the oath) and assumed office before the ban took effect.[55] To the respondents, to construe the word “appointment” in Section 15, Article VII simply as an “act” of the President would defeat the purpose of the provision because the President can easily circumvent the prohibition by simply antedating the appointment.[56] Since the petitioners took their oath and assumed office when the constitutional ban on appointment had already set in, they are considered midnight appointees whose appointments are intrinsically invalid for having been made in violation of the constitutional prohibition. Lastly, petitioners cannot claim any violation of their right to due process or to security of tenure simply because their appointments were invalid.[57] ISSUE The twin issues before us are whether the President has the power to issue E.O. No. 2 that defined the “midnight appointments” contemplated under Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution; and if so, whether E.O. No. 2’s definition of midnight appointment is constitutional. A finding that E.O. No. 2’s definition of midnight appointment is constitutional (thus rendering the petitioners’ appointments invalid) would render any ruling on the petitioners’ security of tenure argument completely unnecessary. An appointment in violation of the Constitution and/or the law is void and no right to security of tenure attaches.[58] MY CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION I vote to partially grant the petitions. Read together, the petitions ask the Court to grant the following reliefs: first, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 2 and the reversal of the assailed CA rulings; second, the declaration of the validity of their respective appointments and their reinstatement to the positions they held prior to the issuance of E.O. No. 2; and, third (as prayed for by petitioners Villanueva and Rosquita) if the term of their appointments had already expired, the grant of back wages with interest. I vote to only partially grant the petitions as I find that only a part of E.O. No. 2 is unconstitutional, i.e., insofar as it unduly expands the scope of midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. I find the rest of the provisions of E.O. No. 2, particularly, Sections 1 (b) and (c) in relation to Section 2, to be valid; the presumption of constitutionality remains since the petitioners did not squarely question the constitutionality of these provisions before the Court. In fact, even if the issue had been raised, none of the petitioners showed that they have the legal standing to question their validity since the petitioners are admittedly appointees of the previous President and not mere appointees of a local chief executive. The constitutionality of these provisions would have to await its resolution in a proper case. Despite the partial invalidity of E.O. No. 2, I also find that the petitioners’ claims for elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/60717 38/75