04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly In my reading, while Mr. Davide was sure of the thrust of his question, Mr. Ople was equivocal about his answer. In fact, what he actually said was that his original intention was for the provision to be self-executing, but Mr. Regalado introduced an amendment. His retort to Mr. Davide's direct question was a cryptic one and far from the usual Ople reply - that the right should immediately influence the climate of public affairs, and that Congress can no longer revoke it. Mr. Ople's thinking may perhaps be better understood if the exchanges in another deliberation - on the issue of whether disclosure should extend to the negotiations leading to the consummation of a state transaction - is considered. The following exchanges took place: MR. SUAREZ: And when we say `transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself? MR. OPLE: The `transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. SUAREZ: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. MR. OPLE: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest. [42] Thus, even if Mr. Ople did indeed mean that the constitutional provisions on the right to information and the duty of disclosure may immediately be effective, these provisions have to recognize, other than those expressly provided by Congress, "reasonable safeguards on the national interest." In constitutional law, this can only refer to safeguards inherent from the nature of the state transaction, the state interests involved, and the power that the state may bring to bear, specifically, its police power. Viewed in this light, the duty to disclose the various aspects of the MOA-AD should not be as simplistic as the ponencia claims it to be as this subject again opens up issues this Court has only began to deal with in the Neri petition[43] and the JPEPA controversy.[44] Of course, this is not the time nor the case for a full examination of the constitutional right to information and the government's duty to disclose since the constitutionality of the MOA-AD is a dead issue. As my last point on a dead issue, I believe that the ponencia did not distinguish in its discussion between the disclosure of information with respect to the peace process in general and the MOA-AD negotiation in particular. I do not believe that these two matters can be interchanged and discussed from the prisms of information and disclosure as if they were one and the same. The peace process as embodied in E.O. No. 3 relates to the wider government effort to secure peace in Mindanao through various offices and initiatives under the Office of the President interacting with various public and private entities at different levels in Mindanao. The peace negotiation itself is only a part of the overall peace process with specifically named officials undertaking this activity. Thus, the consultations for this general peace process are necessarily wider than the consultations attendant to the negotiations proper that has been delegated to the GRP Negotiating Panel. The dynamics and elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/47263 132/203