04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly necessarily the President, from signing the proposed MOA-AD and from negotiating and executing in the future similar agreements. The sheer absurdity of the situation where the hands of executive officials, in their quest for a lasting and honorable peace, are sought to be tied lest they agree to something irreconcilable with the Constitution, should not be lost on the Court. Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute that the maintenance of the peace, insuring domestic tranquility[26] and the suppression of violence are the domain and responsibility of the executive.[27] Now then, if it be important to restrict the great departments of government to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary, equally important, that one branch should be left completely independent of the others, independent not in the sense that the three shall not cooperate in the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by or subjected to the influence of either of the branches.[28] Favorably accommodating the petitioners under the premises cannot but be viewed as a indirect attempt on the part of the Court to control and dictate on the peace prerogatives of the executive branch, and in the process unduly impairing that branch in the performance of its constitutional duties. It will distort the delicate balance of governance which the separation of powers seeks to safeguard. One Last Word The Executive Secretary has categorically declared that the government will not sign the MOA-AD,[29] which, as couched, may indeed be constitutionally frail or legally infirm. But the more important point is that the challenged agreement is an unsigned document without effect and force whatsoever. It conveys no right to and imposes no correlative obligation on either negotiating party. As an unsigned writing, it cannot be declared unconstitutional, as some of my colleagues are wont to do. Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petitions. The factual and legal situations call for this disposition. [1] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936). [2] People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 50 (1937). [3] DBM v. Kolonwel Trading, G.R. Nos. 175608, 175616, June 8, 2007. [4] Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 779; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 812 (2001). [5] Per statement made by Solicitor General Agnes Devanadera during the Oral Arguments on August 28, 2008. [6] Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532. July 10, 1998, citing cases. elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/47263 183/203