4/9/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly In support of their position, the petitioners insist that Serna was healthy during their contract as he allegedly did not complain of any injury or illness on board M/V Hyde Park. They claim that its logbook, supposedly a repository of all its incidents, is bereft of record on this point, and that Captain Jyong, Serna’s superior, did not hear any complaint from him. Despite this position, the petitioners, significantly, never presented the logbook to support their claim. Neither did they present proof to support their claim regarding the ship captain. “A party alleging a critical fact must support [the] allegation with substantial evidence.”[31] Without such evidence, the petitioners’ statements with respect to the vessel logbook and to what Captain Jyong did or did not hear remain hearsay. At any rate, we effectively stated in Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission (First Division)[32] that the Court does not deem a logbook to be a comprehensive and exclusive record of all the incidents in a vessel. We are satisfied, from the discussions of the labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA, that substantial evidence on record exists to support their factual findings on this point. It is inconsequential that Serna’s repatriation was due to a finished contract as an employee’s claim cannot be defeated by the mere fact of his separation from the service.[33] No forfeiture of right to claim disability benefits in this case With Serna’s right to claim disability benefits established, we proceed to the second assailed fact – the determination of whether he has forfeited the right to file a claim. The 1996 POEA-SEC, specifically Section 20(B)(3),[34] requires that a disability claim be supported by a proper post-employment medical report;[35] otherwise, the seafarer forfeits the right to claim the benefits. The labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are one in finding that on July 14, 1999, or two days after his repatriation, Serna reported to the office of Career Phils. specifically to report his medical complaints, only to be told to wait for his referral to company-designated physicians. The referral came not on the following day, but nearly three (3) weeks after, on August 3, 1999. We see no reason to disturb the lower tribunals’ finding. While Serna’s verified claim with respect to his July 14, 1999 visit to the petitioner’s office may be seen by some as a bare allegation, we note that the petitioners’ corresponding denial is itself also a bare allegation that, worse, is unsupported by other evidence on record. In contrast, the events that transpired after the July 14, 1999 visit, as extensively discussed by the CA above, effectively served to corroborate Serna’s claim on the visit’s purpose, i.e., to seek medical assistance. Under these circumstances, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it affirmed the labor arbiter ruling and gave credence to Serna on this point. Under the evidentiary rules, a positive assertion is generally entitled to more weight than a plain denial. We note on this point that the obligation imposed by the mandatory reporting requirement under Section 20(B)(3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC is not solely on the seafarer. It requires the employer to likewise act on the report, and in this sense elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/55380 7/13