5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Michael claims that his failure to return for treatment could not be considered an abandonment that would warrant the forfeiture of his right to disability claims. According to him, the failure of Dr. Cruz to render an assessment of his fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 days with his medical condition remained unresolved, made him totally and permanently disabled. In his case, the 120th day fell on December 26, 2009, which he counted from the time he was repatriated on August 28, 2009. He explains that his failure to report to the company doctor on February 17, 2010, was already beyond the 120-day period. There is, therefore, no abandonment as he was already deemed permanently and totally disabled. He contends that it is the failure to observe the mandatory 3-day reporting requirement under Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC that can result to a forfeiture of the right to claim the said benefits. Michael further argues that he is entitled to attorney’s fees because petitioners refused in bad faith to acknowledge their accountability both under their contract and the law, compelling him to litigate. Reply of Petitioners Petitioners, in their Reply,[23] reiterate that the 120-day rule was already modified pursuant to the Court’s pronouncement in Vergara that the rule should be applied depending on the circumstances of the case. In Michael’s case, the 120-day rule lost its significance when he refused to undergo further treatment under Dr. Cruz, thereby violating the procedure under the POEA-SEC. Michael’s claim for disability benefits must, therefore, fail. The Court’s Ruling The Court finds merit in the petition. The CA’s conclusion that Michael was entitled to permanent total disability benefits on the basis of his inability to perform his sea duties for more than 120 days cannot be justified under the prevailing circumstances. The 120-day rule, as aptly posited by petitioners, has already been clarified in Vergara where it was declared that the 120day rule could not simply be applied as a general rule for all cases and in all contexts. In other words, it cannot be used as a cure-all formula for all maritime compensation cases. Vergara’s application depends on the circumstances of the case, especially the parties’ compliance with their contractual duties and obligations as laid down in the POEA-SEC and/or their CBA, if one exists.[24] In this regard, the Court quotes with approval the ruling of the NLRC, thus: Anent the period of medical treatment, We are not oblivious of the 120 days principle cited by the Labor Arbiter in the Decision; however, the particular circumstances of this case merit different approach. The records firmly established that complainant was diagnosed of “Ulna Styloid Fracture,” commonly known as wrist fracture and as a definitive elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/58642 5/12