5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly be conducted by the company-designated physician. Failure of the seafarer to comply with this three-day mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the forfeiture of his right to claim the POEA-SEC granted benefits. In this case, the records show that Ravena was repatriated on May 12, 2007; he reported to Jebsen only on June 18, 2007 or more than one (1) month from the time of his disembarkation. Without doubt, therefore, Ravena failed to comply with his three-day reporting duty under the POEA-SEC. The reporting requirement, of course, is not absolute as we have allowed, in certain exceptional circumstances, a seafarer's claim despite his non-reporting within the mandated three-day period, i.e., when the seafarer is physically incapacitated to comply with the reporting requirement, provided, he gives, within the same three-day period, a written notice of his incapacity to the manning agency. The facts of this case, unfortunately, do not support a disregard of the three-day reporting rule for as soon as he disembarked in Manila, Ravena immediately went to his hometown in Iloilo which is at a considerable distance from Manila, compared with Jebsen’s office which is in Manila. Even if he had been physically incapacitated, it would have been easier for him to contact Jebsen in Manila than to go home in Iloilo. We note that he took three days to consult with a doctor in Iloilo City and five days (or on May 12, 2007) to inform the petitioners of his illness and the scheduled Whipple surgery. What made matters worse for Ravena was his failure to offer an adequate explanation that could have excused his non-reporting within the three-day period. In the pleadings that he submitted before the LA, the NLRC and even before the CA, he simply claimed that "he opted to go straight home to Iloilo when no agents from [Jebsens] were present to fetch him and attend to his medical need." Yet, he did not explain why, this absence notwithstanding, he did not go to and report directly and personally to Jebsens or to its designated-physician for the mandatory medical check up. Note that this duty to report to the companydesignated physician for the required medical examination lies with him; the POEA-SEC did not impose on Jebsens, as the local agent of the foreign employer, any duty to meet him upon his arrival and bring him to the company-designated physician for the medical examination. Thus, assuming that no Jebsens employee picked him up upon his arrival, the absence did not excuse him from complying with his reporting duty within the three-day mandated period. In addition, there is absolutely no evidence on the record showing a determination of total or partial permanent disability with the corresponding determination of the appropriate disability grading that could have formed the basis for his disability claims. Under Section 20-B(3), the company-designated physician initially determines either the fitness-to-work or the degree of the permanent disability (total or partial) of the seafarer who suffered and was repatriated for work-related illness or injury. The seafarer, of course, is not irretrievably bound by such determination. Should he disagree with the determination of the company-designated physician, the POEA-SEC allows him to seek a second opinion from an independent physician of his choice. If the assessment of his chosen physician conflicts with those of the company-designated physician, the seafarer and the employer may agree on a third doctor whose determination shall be final and binding on them. In this case, neither Dr. Cruz nor Ravena's chosen physician made any determination of Ravena's disability. In fact, we note that Ravena's physician did not even certify that he was no longer fit-to-work, or at the very least determine the appropriate disability grading; he simply stated that “he must not be away from a treatment area for an indefinite period of time.” On the other hand, Dr. Cruz certified that Ravena's illness is not at all work-related. Second, Ampullary cancer is not an occupational disease. Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC considers only two types of cancers as compensable occupational disease: (1) cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder; and (2) cancer, epitheliomatous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to certain chemicals.[37] The LA and the CA may have correctly afforded Ravena the benefit of the legal presumption of workrelatedness. The legal correctness of the CA's appreciation of Ravena's claim, however, ends here for as we pointed out above, Section 20-B(4) affords only a disputable presumption that should be read together with elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/57785 7/12