Separate Opinion 20 G.R. No. 224469 than contradict each other. 46 I most agree that the two laws are not conflicting, and neither one is prevailed upon by the .other, as these laws may be both interpreted and applied to the case in a way that breathes life to both, as I have attempted to elucidate above. In any case, and as aptly noted by the Chief Justice's dissent, doubts have been cast as to the applicability of the IPRA to the present case, and since such doubt is on whether or not petitioners were well within their rights when they cut the dita tree, such doubt must be resolved to stay the Court's hand from affirming their conviction. It has been opined that the effect of requiring petitioners to apply for a permit from the DENR to use a resource in their ancestral domain in accordance with their customs is benign, as they are not prohibited from doing so but only imposed upon with prior conditions. This requirement may indeed be benign, and should have simply been complied with by herein petitioners. This simple enough requirement, however, is an operative indication of an underlying constitutional conviction, the conclusiveness of which the Court may not now be prepared to adjudicate. This requirement quietly asks: how can they seek the consent of another without being counterintuitive to the special, nuanced, and self-limiting autonomy granted to them under the law? How can the Court conceive of finding that indigenous communities are as free as the 1987 Constitution can allow, but must, for the act of felling one tree within their land and for their own customary use, have to seek the State's permission? How can the Court lay down these incongruent premises and hold them both true in the same breath? And yet, on the other hand, the Chief Justice, in his dissent, aptly asks the difficult question of where the line must be drawn with respect to the determination of sustainable community use of an IP' s ancestral domain resource. I acknowledge the assertion made by the Chief Justice that "the case before Us presents far more interrelated issues for whether We would like to admit it or not, the seemingly innocuous acquittal of petitioners herein would ultimately result in considerable implications the Court may not have intended. " 47 But this caution cuts both ways. The same assertion can be made to a conviction of petitioners - that such, too, may result in considerable implications the Court may not have intend~d. ~ To be sure, the facts of this case may not lend itself to all the answers, but perhaps the honor of the work before the Court is in the attempt. I believe that my earlier submission that the self-limiting and tight window within which the indigenous peoples may cut trees from their own ancestral domain without prior permission is narrow enough as to sidestep any need to reconcile rights granted by the IPRA vis-a-vis forestry regulations. This supports the primary aspiration that animates the IPRA, that is to restore to ICCs/IPs their land and affirm their right to cultural integrity and customary ways of life, with socio-cultural and legal space to unfold as they have done since time immemorial. 46 47 Id. Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, p. 40.