Separate Opinion G.R. No. 224469 2 I would be remiss if I fail to recognize the very valid points raised by Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta in his Dissenting Opinion, not the least of which is the overarching reasonable fear. that - the position I espouse, if followed to its logical conclusion, may open the gates for abuse and perhaps facilitate the ease of pillaging our forest covers. Although I maintain my position that these fears, although grounded, may not be the apt cornerstone from which to best reference the resolution of the present issues, I recognize that the Chief Justice raises real and valid apprehensions, which tell me that this case does not lend itself most suited for the adjudication of these deeply contested questions of law, which may be, for now, best left to the wisdom and clarification of the legislature. I further submit that the present case may be resolved without needing a constitutional determination or conclusive harmonization of laws. From the more immediate standpoint of criminal law, the facts of this case are clear. I concur with the ponencia's finding that petitioners here do not incur any criminal liability. From the lens of criminal law, the determination of whether the Court has sufficient basis to find that the accused here are guilty of the act betrays gray areas of interpretations and legislative intents behind the penal provision, specifically the acts included in the violation under P.D. 705, one of which was levelled against petitioners. These equivocal areas must, therefore, and until conclusively determined, color the present prosecution with reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in favor of herein accused. I thus maintain the non-culpability of petitioners for the following reasons:first, petitioners may not be found guilty of violating P.D. 705, Sec. 77 as the lands enumerated therein do not include ancestral domains; and second, in any event, the petitioners' act of cutting the dita tree was undertaken with the required "authority." As Sec. 77 itself provides, petitioners' act of cutting a single dita tree for the purpose of building a toilet for the use of their community is well within the rights granted to Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or Indigenous Peoples (IPs) under the IPRA, and is therefore beyond the ambit of the crimes penalized therein, with its authority rising from no less than the Constitution and the bedrock rationale of the IPRA itself. ' ~ To be sure, this Opinion does not assert that members of the ICCs/IPs be wholly exempted from the reach of the courts' jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Rather, it submits that there can be no finding of a crime having been committed where none was intended by laws. This Opinion does not look at P.D. 705 with the intention of subverting it and granting sweeping, unmerited exemptions in favor of members of the ICCs/IPs. Plainly, no exemption is being carved out for petitioners, for one cannot be exempted from a law that did not contemplate them, to begin with. In the ultimate analysis, while I maintain my position that petitioners cannot be held criminally liable for violating P.D. 705, I likewise recognize the reasonable points raised by the Chief Justice in his dissent. I, too,

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