Separate Opinion
G.R. No. 224469
2
I would be remiss if I fail to recognize the very valid points raised by
Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta in his Dissenting Opinion, not the least of
which is the overarching reasonable fear. that
- the position I espouse, if
followed to its logical conclusion, may open the gates for abuse and perhaps
facilitate the ease of pillaging our forest covers. Although I maintain my
position that these fears, although grounded, may not be the apt cornerstone
from which to best reference the resolution of the present issues, I recognize
that the Chief Justice raises real and valid apprehensions, which tell me that
this case does not lend itself most suited for the adjudication of these deeply
contested questions of law, which may be, for now, best left to the wisdom
and clarification of the legislature.
I further submit that the present case may be resolved without needing
a constitutional determination or conclusive harmonization of laws. From the
more immediate standpoint of criminal law, the facts of this case are clear. I
concur with the ponencia's finding that petitioners here do not incur any
criminal liability. From the lens of criminal law, the determination of whether
the Court has sufficient basis to find that the accused here are guilty of the act
betrays gray areas of interpretations and legislative intents behind the penal
provision, specifically the acts included in the violation under P.D. 705, one
of which was levelled against petitioners. These equivocal areas must,
therefore, and until conclusively determined, color the present prosecution
with reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in favor of herein accused.
I thus maintain the non-culpability of petitioners for the following
reasons:first, petitioners may not be found guilty of violating P.D. 705, Sec.
77 as the lands enumerated therein do not include ancestral domains; and
second, in any event, the petitioners' act of cutting the dita tree was
undertaken with the required "authority." As Sec. 77 itself provides,
petitioners' act of cutting a single dita tree for the purpose of building a toilet
for the use of their community is well within the rights granted to Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) or Indigenous Peoples (IPs) under the IPRA,
and is therefore beyond the ambit of the crimes penalized therein, with its
authority rising from no less than the Constitution and the bedrock rationale
of the IPRA itself.
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To be sure, this Opinion does not assert that members of the ICCs/IPs
be wholly exempted from the reach of the courts' jurisdiction over criminal
offenses. Rather, it submits that there can be no finding of a crime having been
committed where none was intended by laws. This Opinion does not look at
P.D. 705 with the intention of subverting it and granting sweeping, unmerited
exemptions in favor of members of the ICCs/IPs. Plainly, no exemption is
being carved out for petitioners, for one cannot be exempted from a law that
did not contemplate them, to begin with.
In the ultimate analysis, while I maintain my position that petitioners
cannot be held criminally liable for violating P.D. 705, I likewise recognize
the reasonable points raised by the Chief Justice in his dissent. I, too,