i) that, looked at in total, Country X has a GHG debit, ie it has emitted more than its fair share of the total carbon budget consistent with the 1.5 / 2 degree temperature goal; or that ii) that Country X’s current NDC emissions are inadequate in terms of the long term goal (i.e in excess of F1, F2 etc). In relation to (i) above, the remedy could only be compensatory. In relation to (ii) a court might order an increase in emission reductions. It may help to provide a brief illustration of how the framework would operate in practice. Let’s assume, for example, that T (the total carbon budget) is 3000 Gt CO2. D (the sum of all debits) is 1000 Gt CO2. Party X has a GHG debit, D3, of 100 Gt CO2, ie it is responsible for a tenth of the overshoot. On this basis Party X would be liable for a tenth of all loss and damage consequent on the budget having been exceeded. The virtues of such a scheme are multiple. It would: a) anchor aggregate emissions to the long-term term temperature goal; b) provide a strong financial incentive for all Parties to be ambitious in their emission reductions; c) reflect principles of historic responsibility, capacity, equality and the right to sustainable development; d) enable trading in credits and debits (with the availability of credits firmly anchored to the total available carbon budget); e) anchor ‘debits’ / financial contributions to the value of current and projected loss and damage; f) provide a relatively simple and objective framework, ensuring foreseeability and consistency in the application of the duty to prevent to GHG emissions; and g) provide a corresponding framework for determining financial contributions / liabilities. Clearly the proposal might benefit from refinement and elaboration. For present purposes, the aim is less to present a comprehensive scheme for putting the duty to prevent into practice; than to demonstrate, in general terms, the viability of such a scheme, and to indicate the sort of approach that might be adopted by the ICJ to provide a binding global framework for GHG emission reductions. State and corporate accountability for climate change operate in tandem (it is not a case of either / or). Governments owe a duty of care to other governments to regulate activities within their jurisdiction, so as to prevent them causing harm to 52