i) Can the claimant show on the balance of probabilities that violations of their rights are attributable / part attributable to the anthropogenic increase in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases? If so, ii) Have the Respondents materially contributed to that increase? If both questions can be answered in the affirmative the Honourable Commission may well conclude that the Respondent carbon majors have caused the violations in question. More generally the case-law in the UK regarding asbestos and mesothelioma (although not directly analogous to climate change litigation) illustrates the readiness of courts to ensure uncertainties regarding the chain of causation do not operate unfairly against those who have suffered loss and damage. Case-law from both the Netherlands and the US offers clear precedent for establishing a causal link between a single defendant and global climate change. Both cases concerned governmental acts or omissions. In the Urgenda case, for example, the Dutch government's annual contribution to aggregate emissions of 0.42% was not considered to be de minimis and the court rejected the government's submissions that its actions were not a cause of climate change loss and damage. The work of Rich Heede demonstrates that all of the Respondent carbon majors have contributed to the increased atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases at a level beyond that which might be regarded as de minimis. 7. State accountability The Petition refers to the ‘no harm’ principle under public international law. It is respectfully submitted that the Honourable Commission might also consider the extent to which Governments are responsible for violating the human rights of The Filipino People. It is often noted that the countries least responsible for climate change are often thos most vulnerable to its effects. That is certainly true in the case of The Philippines. The graphic below (prepared by the Global Commons Institute) reveals the extent to which The Philippines is a ‘carbon creditor’ (calculated on the basis of equal per capita shares of the ‘carbon budget’): 48